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OBSERVATIONS ON INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGY USE IN THE BRICS
Keith E. Maskus*
I. INTRODUCTIONONE of the primary questions of this conference, arising from
both widely held concerns and hopes, is whether the
BRICS-Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa - along
with other prominent emerging economies such as Mexico, Argentina,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, can sustain their recent remarkable growth
records. The concerns relate to continued prospects for offshoring US
manufacturing and service jobs, with possibly negative consequences for
lower-skilled and medium-skilled Americans. The hopes reflect the in-
creasing recognition that Europe, Japan, and the United States face years
of slow growth or economic stagnation, leaving to key emerging countries
the critical role of driving increases in world demand for the medium-
term.
Many important factors will determine whether the BRICS will con-
tinue to rack up significant growth gains. The most immediate forces are
global and national macroeconomic elements, such as fiscal austerity,
monetary expansion, energy and materials prices, and interest rate and
exchange rate fluctuations. The large sizes of the BRICS economies, es-
pecially China's, have made economic conditions there increasingly im-
portant for world stability. Perhaps for the first time in recent history,
analysts in the developed world must pay close attention to how these
nations are faring in order to understand prospects for their own markets.
If macroeconomics dominates in the short run, structural
microeconomic factors determine growth prospects over longer time ho-
rizons. Among the most important conditions are demographic trends,
educational attainment, policy transparency, infrastructure, trade liberali-
zation and deregulation, and the ability to innovate and adapt technolo-
gies. The various BRICS have registered different performance records
on these basic factors in recent decades. Some have succeeded in moving
underemployed labor and capital to more efficient uses (China, India,
and South Africa). Others have taken advantage of increasing commod-
ity prices (Brazil and Russia). Some have invested heavily in education
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and infrastructure (China) while others lag behind (Russia, Brazil, and
India).
The prevailing story of the BRICS to date has been their seemingly
rapid "catching up" of productivity, wages, and percapita incomes to
levels in richer nations. These factors have been important in pushing
these countries from being highly inefficient in resource allocation and
investments toward a more productive frontier. With many of these gains
now growing more difficult to achieve, the BRICS must turn to the next,
and perhaps most significant, factor: how well situated are they to foster
domestic innovation and the effective acquisition and transformation of
foreign technologies? Its importance cannot easily be overstated; eco-
nomic evidence finds that technical change is the key driver of productiv-
ity gains and long-term economic growth (Keller 2004; Maskus 2012).
In this paper I review the recent performance of some key emerging
economies in terms of their innovativeness and use of technological im-
provements. The focus generally is on China, however, because it has
taken perhaps the greatest strides in this regard and its sheer size makes
the most difference for global structural transformation. After a discus-
sion of performance and policy regimes, the paper turns to an assessment
of potential roadblocks limiting future growth in this area. Overall, the
view here is that these roadblocks are significant and, unless addressed
effectively, could limit the prospects of substantial growth in innovation
and ultimate convergence with more advanced countries, except in spe-
cific areas. Of course, there will continue to be considerable heterogene-
ity among the emerging economies in this regard, as there always has
been, and the likelihood of long-run success for at least some of the
BRICS seems high.
II. INNOVATION PROFILES
It is useful to set the stage by looking at recent indicators of innovation
performance in the BRICS. Basic data on important factors are provided
in Table 1. The top panels consider measures of technology inputs: R&D
as a percentage of GDP and research personnel per million persons of
population. In the decade from 1997 to 2007 virtually all of these coun-
tries saw increases in these ratios but there was marked variability among
them. Russia's share of R&D in GDP rose only 7.7%, in line with the
proportionate increase in the United States, but it saw a decline in the
skill ratio of its population. Brazil began from about the same level as
Russia in terms of R&D but saw somewhat more rapid growth, with such
investments now over 1% of output. Brazil's ratio of research personnel
nearly doubled in the period. India's growth in the R&D performance
measure was similar to Brazil's but it retains a lower overall ratio. India
saw modest growth in its share of technical researchers. South Africa
experienced a rise of over 50% in the share of R&D in GDP and a doub-
ling of research personnel, indicating a growing domestic investment in
the sources of technological change. Finally, China registered by far the
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greatest growth performances in these measures. By 2007 the country
had reached an R&D to GDP ratio of 1.44%, around half that in the
United States, and more than doubled the ratio of R&D researchers in
the population.
A similar message of heterogeneity is delivered by the innovation out-
put measure of patent grants issued by the US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO). This is a useful comparative measure because the
USPTO applies the same standards to applicants from all countries, while
the need to pay associated fees implies that foreign firms generally regis-
ter only inventive ideas. Listed in the bottom panel of Table 1 are the
absolute numbers of grants and the shares of total patents approved by
the USPTO for inventors from each nation. For example, despite the
increase in its relative R&D share, South African inventors saw virtually
no increase in patenting in the United States. Brazilian and Russian in-
ventors were similarly unresponsive in this regard, with no increase in
their shares of American patents. In contrast, the number of Indian pat-
ents went up by a factor of ten, with that country raising its share of US
grants from 0.08% to 0.55%. China's growth was even more remarkable
in this area. Its patent grants rose by a factor of almost thirty and its
share of approvals increased from minimal to over 1.4%. This ability to
capture a rising proportion of US patents during a period of mushroom-
ing global growth in patenting is truly noteworthy.
Direct innovation measures are useful but do not capture the extent of
technology transfer, a critical form of learning and structural change. Of
course, these two concepts are closely related, for inward technology
flows can precipitate domestic spillovers, imitation, and ultimately pro-
vide a basis for local innovation (Keller 2004; He and Maskus 2012). Put
differently, countries that receive significant amounts of technology, and
have enterprises that are capable of both deploying the technology effec-
tively in domestic production and adapting it into localized uses, are gen-
erally capable of building on this information to develop competing
innovations (Chen and Puttitanun 2005; Moran et al. 2005; Maskus
2004a). After some lag, these countries may become significant technol-
ogy exporters as well as importers.
In this context, one reasonable measure of developing innovation ca-
pacity is the growth of two-way technology transfer flows, as detailed in
Table 2. For example, in 1995 each of the BRICS had a significant share
of high technology goods in manufacturing imports, ranging from 13.9%
in India to 23.8% in South Africa.' With the exception of China, these
shares were much lower in manufactured exports in 1995, indicating a
largely one-way high technology flow in traded goods. All of these na-
tions saw a rise in the high technology share of imports between 1995 and
2005, with the proportions in India and China doubling. But China was
the only one with a similarly sharp rise on the export side (and, indeed,
1. For this purpose, high technology goods are defined as pharmaceuticals and
medicines, electronic equipment, and aerospace products.
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ran a trade surplus in these goods in the latter year), although Brazil in-
creased its share of high technology exports by 4.1 percentage points.
This share actually declined in Russia and was static in South Africa. On
this simple measure, then, China stands out among the BRICS as a coun-
try that has seen its trade structure migrate heavily toward higher-tech-
nology goods, with substantial two-way exchange going on.
A second measure of technology flows is the inward and outward
stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). As economists note, multina-
tional enterprises are properly thought of as more conduits of technical
improvements across borders than as sources of financial capital
(Markusen 2002). Thus, rapidly growing stocks, which are measures of
cumulative FDI flows, should, in some degree, capture emerging two-way
investments in technology transfer.2 As noted in the bottom panel of Ta-
ble 2, all the BRICS remained net recipients of FDI between 2000 and
2008 but there was remarkable growth in the outward direction in all
cases. China's outward stock grew from $28 billion to $148 billion, while
India's expanded by a factor of over thirty. Much of this outward expan-
sion reflected investments in other developing countries. Indeed, the rel-
atively new phenomenon of growing South-South FDI is attracting
increased scrutiny by international economists. But a sizeable proportion
of it, especially from China, Brazil, and India, has been aimed at take-
overs and greenfield investments in the developed world (He and Maskus
2012).
A similar point may be made from the data on payments and receipts
of royalties and licensing fees in the final panel. These figures, taken
from balance-of-payments data, primarily account for net flows of li-
censed technologies, brand names, and copyrighted materials, such as
software, and are the most direct measure of cross-border information
transactions. As may be seen, the amount of payments made by the
BRICS mushroomed between 1995 and 2008, growing from over $500
million for China (in 2007) to $10.3 billion. All of the BRICS remain
significant net importers of technology by this measure. But, with the
exception of South Africa, the BRICS' gross receipts of such technology
fees also grew extremely rapidly.
To summarize, all of the BRICS remain significant net recipients of
formal technology flows, whether through trade, FDI, or licensing of in-
tellectual property. This is true whether measured as absolute dollar val-
ues or relative to some activity benchmark, such as GDP or
manufacturing trade. In virtually all cases, these countries have increased
their relative investments in innovation inputs and now receive more pat-
ent grants at the USPTO. But there are considerable differences across
countries in these measures and only China stands out as a major growth
locus in all these dimensions. That is particularly true with our measures
2. It should be noted that the UNCTAD data from which these stocks were taken
refer to total stocks, not just manufacturing.
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of two-way technology trade, which anticipate the emergence of China as
a significant international competitor in new products and technologies.
The data suggest that a process of technological catch-up is underway
in the BRICS. This is especially the case in China, but there are clear
hints of it in Brazil and India as well. The following section will offer
further perspective on this question with regards to China. It is worth
pointing out that any conclusions drawn from such figures should be
treated cautiously as statistical measures may capture quite different fac-
tors across countries. For example, the definition of what constitutes a
researcher, and the nature of her credentials, varies widely. China's edu-
cational system produces a great many scientists and engineers, but, at
least to this point in time, their productivity in research lags that of most
developed countries.
Similarly, a significant amount of what is considered R&D spending in
China occurs in either public laboratories or state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), which may limit the productivity of that spending in innovation.
Further, the statistics on growth in patents granted reflect many factors,
including most importantly the sectors in which economies tend to spe-
cialize. In the case of China, for example, these USPTO patents are over-
whelmingly in software and microelectronics, industries where it is
common for firms to register patents on small slivers of innovation (Hu
and Jefferson 2009). Indeed, the bulk of these patents were granted to
just six Chinese enterprises, such as Huawei and Hong Fu Jin Precision
Industries-a major assembler of the iPhone 3-and Microsoft, which ac-
tively engages in software development in China. Finally, the promi-
nence of consumer electronics assembly in China's production structure
itself explains much of the growth in China's high technology imports and
exports. These goods are counted in trade on the basis of gross value,
rather than value added. As has been well documented, the value added
contributed by Chinese enterprises in such sectors remains small, though
it is growing as a share of exports (Koopman et al 2008). China's exports
in other high technology industries, such as pharmaceuticals, precision
machinery, and aerospace equipment, remain relatively small (OECD
2007).
With this kind of uncertainty from basic data it may be more informa-
tive to consider independent measures of each country's overall engage-
ment with innovation, research, and knowledge. Thus, Table 3 lists the
World Bank's Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) for each of the BRICS
plus the United States in 2000 and 2012. The KEI is designed to measure
"whether the environment is conducive for knowledge to be effectively
used for economic development." 4 It is the average score of four "pil-
3. See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/asgstc/cnx-ror.htm. More
perspective may be found in Maskus (2012).
4. KI and KEI Indexes, World Bank, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/WBIWBIPROGRAMS/KFDLP/EXTUNIKAM/0,,contentMDK:20584278-
menu PK:1 433216-pagePK:64168445-piPK:64168309-theSitePK:1 414721,00.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
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lars" of the knowledge economy: economic incentives and institutional
regime, education, innovation, and activities in information and commu-
nication technology (ICT).
This index offers a rather different picture than the transactions data
above. Specifically, nearly all of these countries have been relatively
stagnant in their rankings in the early years of the twenty-first century,
according to the World Bank. India saw its index level decline and it lost
three spots in the global rankings, with similar results in Brazil. South
Africa's performance was the least attractive of the group, falling four-
teen places in the rankings. Russia experienced a small improvement in
its index, with associated gains in the rankings. Again, the largest im-
provement was in China, with its index rising over 11% and a rise of ten
spots relative to other countries. Nonetheless, its absolute index still lags
behind those in Brazil and South Africa, while barely reaching half that in
the (declining) United States. Put briefly, China's economy may be
catching up to the West, but it has a long way to go. Innovation and
technical change are still in their initial phases in both China and India.
Other national innovation measures are available but would tell a similar
story (Maskus 2012).
III. MEDIUM-TERM INNOVATION PREPAREDNESS
The relatively low positioning of the BRICS in these KEI indexes, and
the apparent recent stagnation of some of these countries in this context,
raise two important questions. Specifically, what essential national fac-
tors determine the capability of enterprises to become more engaged
over time in creativity, innovation, and the use of science and technol-
ogy? And how well positioned are these BRICS to build and take advan-
tage of a robust system of innovation over the next ten years or so? The
discussion here will focus on China, the country that Western observers
seem most worried or optimistic about, with additional commentary of-
fered for other BRICS where relevant.
A. BASIC CONDITIONS
For purposes of describing pro-innovation national characteristics it is
useful to follow the categorization set out by the OECD in its periodic
surveys (OECD 2007). As that organization notes, the strongest determi-
nants of innovation capabilities come from the country's framework con-
ditions or economic environment. The first framework condition is the
pervasiveness and quality of the educational system and the opportunities
it gives students to think creatively. Here, China has made considerable
strides, seeing its secondary enrollment rate (secondary enrollment as a
percentage of associated age group) rise from 58% in 1997 to 81% in
2010. In contrast, India's rate was 47% in 1997 and rose to just 63% in
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2010.5 The other BRICS already had high secondary enrollment rates in
1997, including 99% in Brazil (unchanged by 2010), 92% in Russia (down
to 89% in 2010), and 90% in South Africa (up to 94% in 2010). At the
tertiary level, enrollment rates reached 26% in 2010 in China, with corre-
sponding figures of 27% in Brazil, 18% in India, and 76% in Russia (data
unavailable for South Africa). For comparison, the tertiary enrollment
rate in 2010 for the United States was 95%.
On these simple indicators, China is rapidly gaining on the other
BRICS nations, if not the major developed economies, in achieving uni-
versal secondary education. University enrollments, which remain lim-
ited to successful performers on standardized examinations, lag well
behind in China, while India faces structural problems in expanding such
access for students from rural and impoverished backgrounds. Of course,
rising enrollments do not necessarily imply improving quality. It is com-
mon to argue that China's focus on rote learning and standardized exami-
nations diminishes the ability of its students to think creatively and,
ultimately, to contribute to national innovation (OECD 2007). Still,
China's students have registered unmistakable gains in global academic
performance measures. For example, in 2009, high school students from
Shanghai finished first on all three key PISA assessments.6 In compari-
son, Russian students were thirty-eighth in mathematics and thirty-ninth
in science and Brazilian students were fifty-seventh in mathematics and
fifty-third in science. Again, for comparison it is worth noting that US
students finished thirty-first in mathematics and twenty-third in science.
It is also important to note that when it comes to building a human
capital stock from which scientific and engineering skills may be
deployed, absolute scale matters considerably. In this context, while
China has seen a rise in most of its proportionate measures of education
and science, the sheer size of its investments dominates the other BRICS.
For example, China is engaged in an ambitious program to build a large
number of research-oriented universities, while expanding its science and
engineering (S&E) enrollments at existing institutions (Maskus 2012).
Perhaps the best measurement of China's large scale ambitions is simply
the fact that China is easily the largest source of international doctoral
students in American S&E programs (Stuen et al. 2012). It is also signifi-
cant that a rapidly increasing share of Chinese students earning a techni-
cal Ph.D. abroad return home to work in enterprises, public research
institutes, or universities, in part because the opportunities in science and
innovation have improved (Kerr 2008).
Thus, while the overall picture is mixed, it is reasonable to expect that
China will achieve a human capital base within the next generation that
will be the foundation for significant global competition in innovative in-
dustries, even if they amount to a small share of the total economy. The
5. World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SE.SEC.ENRR (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
6. http://ourtimes.wordpress.com/2008/04/10/oecd-education-rankings/.
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outlook for the other BRICS appears to foretell stasis or limited growth
in this context.
A second major determinant of national innovation capacity is the
competitiveness of product and capital markets (OECD 2007). The
BRICS all have undergone significant liberalization of trade and invest-
ment barriers in recent years, with China now perhaps the most open of
all the BRICS in the wake of its entry into the WTO in 2001 (Maskus
2012). One simple measure of this openness is the weighted-average
tariff rate across all industrial sectors, which in China fell from 12.3% in
2001 to 3.7% in 2009.7 Comparable tariff rates for Brazil were 10.4%
(2001) and 9.9% (2009), for India 21.0% (2004) and 7.2% (2009), for Rus-
sia 8.9% (2001) and 6.6% (2009), and for South Africa 4.9% (2001) and
4.6% (2009). Thus, by 2009 China had the lowest average tariff rate and
had cut its import taxes by a far larger proportion than the other BRICS,
though all five had achieved relatively low industrial tariffs by the end of
last decade. Similarly, according to expert opinion at the World Eco-
nomic Forum, China reduced its protection against imports and restric-
tions against FDI between 1995 and 2008 by considerably more than did
India, Brazil, and numerous other emerging economies (Maskus 2012).
All of this liberalization has expanded external competition in these mar-
kets, while bringing in significantly larger amounts of international tech-
nology, ultimately stimulating more innovation.
Still, while trade and investment openness are important, they may
have little impact if not accompanied by strongly competitive forces in
internal markets. Here, the BRICS have made considerably less pro-
gress, including China (OECD 2007). China retains significant internal
distortions in labor and capital markets, experiences extensive market in-
tervention by federal and provincial authorities, protects inefficient
SOEs, and has little tradition or experience with anti-monopoly regula-
tion. So far, at least, its universities, public research institutions, and en-
terprises have been ineffective at commercializing new knowledge to
create and introduce innovative goods. Brazil and India have fared
somewhat better in this regard, at least in particular sectors, though entry
of new firms in India remains a daunting prospect. These difficulties may
be seen by the "ease of doing business" indicators published by the World
Bank.8 On this score, in 2011, Singapore ranked first, Hong Kong second,
and New Zealand third. In contrast, China was ninety-first, Brazil 126th,
India 132nd, Russia 120th, and South Africa thirty-fifth. Thus, with the
possible exception of South Africa, dealing with corruption, red tape, and
other barriers to entry continues to restrain competition in the BRICS.
Moreover, in China, significant problems remain with corporate gov-
ernance regarding innovation (OECD 2007). For example, the cautious
and political orientation of SOEs offers few incentives for long-term in-
7. Data from World Bank, WITS data source, at http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/.
8. World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IC.BUS.EASE.XQ (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
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vestments in risky R&D projects, especially aimed at foreign markets or
meeting rapid changes in consumer demand. Additionally, China suffers
from limited development of private financial markets for funding inno-
vation and there is only a fledgling venture capital market. These two
problems - uncompetitive domestic markets and poorly structured inno-
vation incentives and supports - remain the primary medium-term block-
age to the development of domestic innovation societies, especially in
China and India.
A final major framework condition is the structure of intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs). Innovative economies strive to ensure effective pro-
tection for new inventions, technical secrets, creative ideas, and brand
names, while striking a balance between the needs of firms to profit from
their creative investments and users to access new knowledge. The pe-
riod from 1995 to 2010 saw remarkable increases in the scope of legal
protections for patents, trademarks, and copyrights in all emerging econ-
omies, especially the BRICS (Maskus 2012). Brazil, India, and China all
adopted significantly updated patent laws in this period, partly in re-
sponse to the need to meet WTO obligations. China, in particular, en-
acted major changes in all forms of intellectual property in the wake of its
entry into the WTO in 2001 and now has a legal framework for protection
that is not much different from that in the United States. Brazil re-
vamped its patent laws in the late 1990s, also adopting significant new
protective norms. India enacted its latest patent law in 2005, clarifying
that pharmaceutical products and agricultural chemicals are eligible for
protection. Each country also has extensive copyright regimes, though
both patents and copyrights are subject to important limitations and ex-
ceptions. For example, all three nations assert an active role for compul-
sory licensing of critical patented goods, especially new essential
medicines. Brazil and India implicitly require domestic production to
sustain a patent in force, and India offers broad scope for educational use
of copyrighted materials.
Of course, while legal reforms are important, they are not very mean-
ingful if the laws are enforced poorly or on a discriminatory basis. In this
context, China still faces considerable obstacles in achieving a transparent
and effective IPRs regime (Suttmeier and Yao 2011). Beyond the obvi-
ous problems of endemic trademark counterfeiting, widespread copying
of digital products, and websites posting copyrighted goods are several
structural difficulties. Among the more important problems are inade-
quate investments in enforcement, especially of infringing exports, re-
gional differences in levels of protection, administrative mismanagement,
and insufficient provision of judicial procedures, which may seem tilted
against international companies (Mertha 2005; Maskus 2012). Such
problems plague both foreign firms and innovative domestic enterprises,
which react in strategic ways that limit China's ability to benefit from
access to new technologies. Survey results find that the situation makes
innovative firms more reluctant to transfer their frontier technologies to
2012] 545
546 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
domestic partners or licensees, reduces the willingness of domestic inno-
vators to commercialize their knowledge, damages the quality reputation
of Chinese enterprises, and limits investments in global quality (OECD
2007; Maskus 2004b). China is now investing more resources in enforce-
ment, which should reduce these problems, but infringement of patents
and loss of trade secrets remain a severe challenge for international
enterprises.
B. INNOVATION POLICIES
Where China clearly outstrips the other BRICS is in the clear strategic
priority it places on building a modern national innovation system (NIS)
and facilitating the emergence of a globally competitive, technology-
based economy. All emerging economies recognize that, in order to sup-
port competition and growth, it is important to create a system of institu-
tions, markets, enterprises, and consumers that turn knowledge into
innovation and effectively absorb technologies into production processes.
Only a few, however, such as Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and, most
recently, China, have elevated this objective into a national policy obses-
sion, albeit with different models.
Thus, in the mid-1990s, the government of China stated the develop-
ment of domestic science and technology as a major economic priority.
Several initiatives were launched to build innovation capacity in such
high technology sectors as biotechnology, advanced materials, and ICT
(Xue and Liang 2010). Central to this effort was a major and ongoing
investment in establishing high-level research universities and facilitating
commercialization of their research through linkages to SOEs and crea-
tion of spinoff companies. Similarly, there are extensive public supports
for domestic R&D centers, with over 2300 existing in SOEs today. Re-
lated incentives for multinational enterprises to establish R&D facilities
in China have borne fruit, with over 1000 of them in key cities.
Correspondingly, Chinese enterprises and public authorities have in-
creased investments in research, with the R&D/GDP ratio rising from
0.6% in 1995 to nearly 1.5% in 2007, as noted earlier. Such major enter-
prises as Haier, Lenovo, and Huawei grew larger and more focused on
technological change and innovation in this period. Still, these figures
should be kept in perspective. A large portion of the increase in R&D
came from public investments in science and the establishment of re-
search centers owned by foreign concerns (Xue and Liang 2010). Rela-
tively little investment has emerged in SOEs or small Chinese firms.
Further, even large firms, such as Lenovo and Huawei, disproportion-
ately bought or licensed technologies and production rights rather than
invested in new global technologies. In China's high technology sectors,
domestic enterprises still lag significantly behind their competitors in the
advanced economies. As the OECD (2007) puts it, there is far more "D"
than "R" in the country's R&D investment, with little evidence of much
shift to date. For such reasons, Chinese authorities remain concerned
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that even larger domestic enterprises are well below the frontiers of tech-
nology competitiveness. Despite solid gains in productivity, many-espe-
cially among Chinese thought leaders-still think of the country as a
location for assembly factories rather than a source of new technology.
Recognizing such problems, in February 2006 the State Council pub-
lished a document setting out guidelines and principles for developing
scientific and technological capacity in the Chinese economy. These prin-
ciples run the gamut of government actions that could support, or even
mandate, the development of a full national innovation system. Addi-
tional incentives were offered for supporting university research, technol-
ogy transfer of research results to private and public enterprises, and
even filing patent applications.
The central element of the new policy was the requirement that pro-
moting "indigenous innovation" would become the most important ele-
ment of S&T policy at all levels of government. Such encouragement had
long been a policy objective but never elevated to this level. Government
procurement programs at the national and provincial levels were targeted
as a primary instrument for supporting innovation by Chinese enterprises
(Ernst 2010; Suttmeier and Yao 2011). Thus, in November 2009 the Min-
istry of Science and Technology (MOST) and two other agencies defined
terms under which products could be certified as developed by indige-
nous innovators in six industries: software, telecommunication products,
office equipment, computer and application devices, alternative energy
technologies, and high-efficiency energy-saving products. The policy de-
fined criteria under which a Chinese enterprise could have a certified
product put into a public catalogue of goods approved for government
procurement.
It should be noted that the original guidelines amounted to a particu-
larly discriminatory policy biased against international technology devel-
opers. Of greatest concern were the draft rules regarding IPRs. There
were requirements that qualifying enterprises must own or acquire IPRs
developed in China and that trademarks must be originally registered
there. This rule in essence tied procurement-market access to intellectual
property ownership. Foreign IPRs holders would have to transfer those
rights, or even the R&D done under their protection, to a domestic enter-
prise. Under the guidelines, the certified technologies had to achieve rec-
ognized levels of global standards, meaning that the associated IPRs
would be valuable. A further condition stated that use or improvement
of intellectual property could not be restricted by foreign firms. This pol-
icy would prevent original IPRs owners from issuing standard contract
terms regarding local sales, ownership of follow-on technologies, or li-
censing of local rights.
Obviously, these procurement rules, especially in connection with com-
plementary policies encouraging or requiring the surrender of Chinese
patent rights to domestic business partners within a given period of time,
were controversial for technology developers. Many foreign businesses
2012] 547
548 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
and, interestingly, larger Chinese enterprises objected strongly to the pro-
curement policy and its implications for IPRs ownership. Under this
pressure, in 2010, MOST issued a new document that considerably soft-
ened the procurement conditions, essentially abandoning the Chinese-or-
igin IPRs requirement and the limitations on contract terms. Still, the
basics remain in place, and time will tell whether this heavy-handed bit of
industrial policy will be implemented.
Whether it will be effective in promoting domestic innovation also re-
mains unclear, based on recent history. For example, China's efforts to
develop domestic-and inherently discriminatory-ITC standards have
met with mixed success (Ernst 2010). The government has successfully
promoted a domestic 3G standard that is commonly used in cell phones
sold in China, an example of using the large market to foster a home
technology. But at this time there are no Chinese-developed standards
that have made successful international inroads.
To summarize, China continues to target innovation and S&T policy as
a high priority for public policy. Undoubtedly, the country will continue
to make large public and private investments in education and research
infrastructure and will pursue incentives for encouraging domestic inno-
vation, while working within its rules and international obligations to fos-
ter rapid acquisition of international technologies. Already it is possible
to see signs of increasing innovation, both in terms of quantity and qual-
ity, in such sectors as solar panels, biofuels, automobile parts, appliances,
and biotechnology. Still, structural problems remain that will take some
time to overcome, suggesting that China's emergence as a full global com-
petitor in the knowledge arena is perhaps a generation away.
The other BRICS certainly have innovation policies in place, but they
are not as extensive or centrally directed as China's strategy. India in-
vests heavily in public research institutes, but the ability of those entities
to transfer new technologies seems limited by numerous factors (Maskus
2012). Brazil has strong technology orientations in a few industries, such
as sugar, biofuels, and small aircraft. Its government has also taken sev-
eral recent steps to build a stronger national innovation system, including
incentives for commercialization of research done in universities and pub-
lic research laboratories. So far, however, the country has largely failed
to establish an overall culture of innovation (Mazzoleni and Povoa 2010).
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The discussion to this point suggests that, while there are clear signs of
growing innovation and technology use in the BRICS, there remain sig-
nificant structural difficulties that must be addressed to establish fully
competitive cultures of innovation and creativity. China has proceeded
furthest in terms of policy reforms, investments in research infrastructure,
and incentive systems, but continues to be plagued by problems of weakly
enforced IPRs, corruption, favoritism, and misallocated capital for R&D.
India has made considerable strides in software and ITC services and has
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spawned some major private global corporations, such as Tata Industries
and Dr. Reddy's (Jonsson 2008). But few of these originate globally com-
petitive innovation, while much of India's economy has barely touched
the modern technological sector. Brazil, Russia, and South Africa all fea-
ture the existence of technologically oriented companies in specific sec-
tors, but do not score very highly on global innovation scales. Each of
those economies is dominated by development and exports of primary
commodities, which are less likely to spawn rapid technological increases,
contrasted with the microelectronics industry in China.
In brief, the BRICS all share some features and successes in their tech-
nological catch-up processes, but their experiences have been quite va-
ried in terms of industry mix, capital markets, R&D, and public policy.
None of them is currently a consistent contributor to global technical ad-
vances, and only China (and possibly Brazil) seems poised at this time to
enter that competition anytime soon. Put differently, catch-up is a real
phenomenon, which ultimately will make most or all of today's BRICS a
significant source of innovation, but that emergence remains more a long-
term than a medium-term prospect.
Nor should we lose sight of further potential roadblocks for technologi-
cal growth in the BRICS. For example, there are already signs of dimin-
ishing returns to R&D investments in China, as the easily attainable gains
from imitation and acquisition of technologies give way to the hard work
of original invention (Maskus 2012). Further, to some degree, China and
Brazil seem caught in an emerging "middle income trap," which means
that wages and costs have risen in labor-intensive manufacturing, but the
shift of activity into higher-skilled and innovative sectors is insufficient to
absorb these costs. It will be interesting to see if China in particular can
manage this transition effectively before its ongoing demographic prob-
lem of rapid aging inevitably diverts resources from R&D to social pro-
grams. Finally, endemic problems of corruption and concentrated
political power continue, which tends to channel resources in directed
and inefficient ways rather than through channels that respond to market
demands. Each of the BRICS, but especially China and Russia, must
come to grips with this fundamental problem.
These are significant roadblocks to further development of innovative
societies, but they must be kept in perspective. Other, now developed,
economies, including South Korea, Singapore, Japan, and even the
United States, have been described in similar terms at various points in
history. Each of the BRICS faces strong challenges which can be over-
come with a firm vision and appropriate policies. Betting on technologi-
cal failure in the long run, especially for China, seems unwise at this
point.
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Table 1. Broad Technology Indicators in the BRICS and United States
Researchers in R&D per
R&D as a share of GDP million population
Country 1997 2007 % change 1997 2007 % change
Brazil 0.96 1.10 14.6 340 657 93.2
China 0.64 1.44 125.0 477 1,071 124.5
India 0.69 0.80 15.9 110 145 31.8
Russia 1.04 1.12 7.7 3,598 3,305 -8.1
S. Africa 0.60 0.92 53.3 199 396 99.0
USA 2.58 2.72 5.4 4,179 4,745 13.5
Patent grants at USPTO
Country 2000 (%) 201!
Brazil 98 (0.06) 215 (0.09)
China 119 (0.08) 3,174 (1.41)
India 131 (0.08) 1,234 (0.55)
Russia 183 (0.12) 298 (0.13)
S. Africa 111 (0.07) 123 (0.06)
USA 85,068 (54.0) 108,626 (48.4)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators and United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Table 2. Measures of Two-Way Technology Transfer in the BRICS
High technology Imports High technology Exports
1995 2005 1995 2005
Country $billion % of $billion % of $billion % of $billion % of
mfg. mfg. mfg. mfg
Brazil 8.7 22.3 16.3 29.0 2.4 9.0 8.4 13.1
China 22.0 20.7 209.4 41.0 24.4 19.2 284.8 40.0
India 2.9 13.9 20.1 26.8 1.5 6.5 5.5 7.4
Russia 5.2 19.3 17.3 24.2 1.3 4.3 1.9 3.3
S. Africa 5.0 23.8 10.8 28.2 0.7 5.1 1.7 5.1
Outward FDI
Inward FDI Stock Stock Royalties and License Fees
2000 2008 2000 2008 1995 1995 2008 2008
Country $billion $billion $billion $billion Payments($m) Receipts($m) Payments($m) Receipts($m)
Brazil 122.3 287.7 51.9 155.7 529 32 2,697 465
China 193.3 378.1 27.8 147.9 543' 55* 10,319 571
India 16.3 125.2 1.7 63.3 90 1 1,529 148
Russia 32.2 215.8 20.1 205.5 34 4 4,595 453
S. Africa 43.4 68.0 32.3 50.0 293 45 1,676 54
Sources: UN Comtrade database, UNCTAD STAT database, and World Bank, World Development Indicators. * Data are for
1997.
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Table 3. World Bank Knowledge Economy Index for the BRICS
Knowledge Economy Index
Country 2000 (rank) 2012 (rank)
Brazil 5.55 (58) 5.56 (60)
China 3.92 (94) 4.37 (84)
India 3.17 (107) 3.06 (110)
Russia 5.41 (64) 5.78 (55)
South Africa 5.73 (53) 5.21 (67)
USA 9.32 (6) 8.77 (12)
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM-page5.asp
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